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Why we must end the ‘Critical’/ ‘Analytical’ Divide  
 
Opposition between ‘analytical’ and ‘critical’ traditions in philosophy is misguided and 
counterproductive.  Not before time, this distinction is disappearing from mainstream philosophy.  
Disappointingly, it persists in legal philosophy.  For deeply outmoded reasons the reading lists for 
legal theory courses at analytically minded law schools bear little similarity to those provided at 
critical law schools.  Legal philosophers attach importance to the work of Raz and Finnis or that of 
writers like FitzPatrick and Douzinas.  It is rare for academic writing to acknowledge that all four are 
engaged in worthwhile, interesting and significant theoretical enterprise. 
There could be any number of reasons why this schism persists in legal theory.  It may be that legal 
theorists on both sides have a vested professional interest in preserving the myth that critical 
engagement is radically and irreconcilably ‘Other’ to analytical jurisprudence.  This essay will 
concentrate on a specific error made by both sides; each one misunderstands the significance of ‘the 
Heideggerian turn’ in philosophy and its relevance to theories about what judges ought to do when 
they decide cases. 
The twentieth century split between these theoretical approaches begins with Heidegger.  Where 
legal theorists have engaged with Heidegger’s work they have operated on the incorrect assumption 
that acceptance of his position would render normative theories of adjudication redundant.  This 
mistake can be seen across the analytical/critical divide when Heidegger is explicitly mentioned.  It is 
made by analytical theorists who oppose Heidegger, like Michael S. Moore, critical theorists who cite 
Heidegger’s work with approval, like Pierre Schlag, and writers that are ‘sceptical’ of both traditions, 
like Stanley Fish.   As I will show, Heidegger’s philosophy is actually an endorsement of the sorts of 
normative legal theories that Moore, Posner, Dworkin and other analytical writers provide. 
Throughout this essay I focus on direct references to Heidegger and his work yet my point is not 
merely interpretative.  While only certain theorists mention Heidegger by name or engage in any 
analysis of his work, the entire critical tradition in legal philosophy takes the Heideggerian turn in 
one form or another and makes the same error about the consequences of that turn.  I shall refer to 
writers like Moore, Schlag, Fish, Rorty, Douzinas, Warrington, Schank, Morgan and Hamula.  Yet my 
point applies equally to anyone who takes philosophical figures inspired by Heidegger as the 
platform for a position that assumes normative legal theory has no merit.  Derrida is commonly used 
in this way.1   
My argument is also aimed at anyone that assumes the continental or critical tradition is to be 
ignored because it is inimical to analytical approaches.  This assumption is also wrong, for precisely 
the same reasons. A number of readers will automatically cease reading at this point at the mere 
mention of Heidegger’s name.  This is symptomatic of the outdated and parochial attitude that I 
attack.  There is nothing that I can write at this point to dissuade anyone so incurious and close-
minded. 
I begin by showing how Heidegger’s early work is the basis for all twentieth century critical or 
continental philosophy.  Borrowing from work done by Brian Leiter, I then show how scepticism 
                                                          
1 See DOUZINAS AND RONNIE WARRINGTON, POSTMODERN JURISPRUDENCE (Routledge, 1991) 
about the value of normative theories of adjudication might seem like a logical consequence of the 
Heideggerian turn.  I go on to demonstrate that a more complete Heideggerian account of 
adjudication leads directly to a justification of the normative theories of adjudication that we find in 
contemporary analytical jurisprudence.  If we properly explore the role of theoria in Heidegger’s 
philosophy, if we give an accurate account of normative legal theory, such approaches are inherently 
impactful on the practice of judging.  Normative legal theory is, in fact, necessary to that practice.  
Finnis and Dworkin are just as true to Heidegger’s philosophy as Douzinas and Schlag.  I conclude 
with some remarks about the broader implications of this sort of lazy assumption about key figures 
in the history of ideas and some of the dangers that it presents in all of our theoretical engagements. 
 
1. Being and Time and the Critical Tradition 
The ground zero for a distinctly ‘critical’ or ‘continental’ philosophy in twentieth century thought is 
Heidegger’s Being and Time.  Heidegger’s lifetime project was to return the neglected question of 
Being to the centre of philosophical discourse.  He did so by critiquing certain assumptions in 
western philosophy up until that point.  Metaphysics and epistemology start from a faulty premise 
according to this argument.  ‘Man’ and ‘world’ do not exist in different realms, in the way that 
realism, idealism and nominalism suggest.  The Cartesian project of trying to explain knowledge as 
though it were some lofty ideal we aspire towards is wrongheaded.  Knowledge, or ‘Understanding’ 
is something that we display all of the time in our daily lives.  We are always ‘worlded’; we cannot 
fail to engage with the world around us.  If we wish to comprehend Understanding we should look to 
our practical activities.  Capturing ‘external’ reality is something that we do all of the time as part of 
our existence.  For example, our Understanding of a hammer comes from picking it up and using it as 
a ‘piece of equipment’ to achieve various practical ends in our lives; we get no greater insight by 
“staring at the hammer-thing” and trying to figure out its essential nature.  Understanding 
‘Understanding’ is about investigating how we live and what we do instead of trying to gain access to 
some higher plane beyond our daily lives. 
The important questions in philosophy thus relate to existence itself.  All of Heidegger’s later work 
moves towards a ‘fundamental ontology’ that will get us back to this question.  This is the starting 
point for all critical philosophy from that point onwards.  Sartre specifically uses Heidegger as the 
starting point for his own thought and the existentialist movement that followed.  Arendt and 
Levinas were both disciples of the early Heidegger.  Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy has its 
origins in Being and Time.  Derrida’s biggest philosophical influence was Heidegger to the extent that 
he was occasionally referred to as “the French Heidegger”; the term ‘deconstruction’ itself comes 
from the French translation of a term in Heidegger’s work.  This is a diffuse array of positions and 
these prominent thinkers disagree with each other (and Heidegger) on many points.  It is also the 
case that earlier philosophers were rediscovered as part of the emergence of this movement, most 
notably Nietzche and Kierkegaard.  The key point is this; it all begins with agreement that Heidegger 
had dissolved the metaphysical and epistemological questions that had pre-occupied philosophy up 
until that point and would continue to provide the focus for the analytical tradition.  Any approach 
to legal theory that is based on these writers, or anyone else within this tradition, also accepts the 
Heideggerian turn as a starting point.  This is expressly acknowledged by those that have taken the 
time to trace the philosophical background to various critical movements in legal theory; Peter 
Schanck traces the roots of postmodernist theories of statutory interpretation to this particular 
aspect of Heidegger’s thought.2 
In both critical and analytical jurisprudence, two important assumptions are made about this 
Heideggerian tradition when it is related to legal theory.  The first is that ‘foundational’ disputes – 
metaphysics, epistemology and the essential nature of man - are dead and not to be resurrected.  
The second is that normative theories of adjudication are redundant; that is, any grand theory of 
what judges ought to do when they decide cases is a waste of time. 
This second assumption is the initial focus of my argument.  It is incorrect.  There is nothing in the 
Heideggerian turn (and hence nothing in the foundations of critical legal theory) that leads to, or can 
even sustain, this conclusion.  On the contrary; the normative theories of analytical writers like 
Dworkin, Posner and Moore are justified under the Heidegger’s foundational claims.  The 
Heideggerian turn has had an impact on normative theories of adjudication, but these writers 
already reflect that turn in their positions.  The only type of normative theory that Heidegger’s 
account of theoria rules out is an approach that no theorist, analytical or otherwise, would ever take 
anyway.  It is philosophically defensible to be sceptical about the value or impact of normative 
theories of adjudication, but such a position would require one to depart from Heidegger, re-open 
foundational disputes and hence depart from the very bedrock of the supposed split between 
analytical and critical philosophy. 
The two prevailing assumptions behind the wall that separates critical legal scholarship and 
analytical approaches are thus incompatible and irreconcilable.  The division is philosophically 
indefensible.  Analytical and critical scholars are equally to blame for perpetuating it.  Since this 
assumption is so pervasive and unchallenged, in legal theory we only get glimpses of the manner in 
which it has stemmed from a misreading of Heidegger’s work.  Scholars operate on the assumption 
without addressing its roots.  We do, however, get hints as to where and how the error is made.  
Brian Leiter’s work is a useful starting point in explaining how the Heideggerian turn operates in the 
context of adjudication.  
 
2. The Heideggerian Turn and Adjudication 
 
 
The Heideggerian turn in describing adjudication can be briefly summarized. Judicial 
comprehension is practical “know-how”.  It comes from being a judge, together with other judges.  
It does not come from some universal, timeless code that we can hope to crack.  This know-how 
defies full and complete articulation.  One can only fully know it, by living it.     
From this brief account we can see why so many have assumed that the Heideggerian turn 
(and therefore critical jurisprudence generally) requires scepticism about any theory that would tell 
judges what they ought to do.  There is no notional textbook inside the minds of judges that they 
apply over concepts in the manner that one might follow a set of instructions.  Trying to provide a 
                                                          
2 Peter C. Shanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its Implications for Statutory Interpretation 65 
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 2505 (1991-1992) 2519-2520. 
set of rules for adjudication in this way would be a waste of time.  This assumption misses two vital 
points, one on the nature of adjudication and one on the nature of normative legal theory.   
Any account of adjudication must explain disagreement and dispute in addition to explaining 
widespread agreement among practitioners.  Heidegger not only explained what happens when we 
understand things easily, he also offers an account of what we have difficulty understanding.  As 
soon as Heidegger’s philosophy is used to explain this essential element in adjudication, normative 
theories of adjudication take on a central, unavoidable role.  In this respect Heidegger is similar to 
Dworkin; every judge is something of a theorist.  In this section, I concentrate on this issue. 
Normative legal theory does not produce sets of instructions for judges, of the sort that is 
ruled out by the Heideggerian turn.  In Heidegger’s later writing he justifies the use of theoria as a 
form of contemplation that operates in service to practical activity.  His conception of theoria is 
similar to John Finnis’ account of jurisprudence as an effort to distinguish the practically useful from 
the practically unhelpful from within the same sphere or paradigm as the practitioner.  Normative 
theories such as that of Dworkin, Moore and Posner fit within the justification for traditional theory 
that Heidegger and Finnis share.  I turn to this issue in later sections.  
 
2.A Agreement 
 
No legal system could work without a shared conception among its practitioners as to the 
source and substantive content of law.  This phenomenon might be explained any number of ways, 
from objective meaning in language to convergence in diverse opinions as to the meaning of legal 
texts. Brian Leiter describes this as “massive and pervasive agreement about the law”3.   Under the 
Heideggerian turn it is explained through “immersion in a shared culture”.  Leiter borrows from 
Heidegger’s work to explain this feature of adjudication.4  
Leiter makes use of the judgment in New York v. United States5.  In this case the petitioners 
argued that the constitutional boundaries of Federal Authority had been overstepped by a series of 
incentives contained in the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act 19856.  These 
incentives encouraged individual states to take responsibility for low-level radioactive waste 
produced within their own state.   
Leiter relates Heidegger’s account of what “we must know in order to know” to the 
understanding of previous authorities demonstrated in Justice O’Connor’s leading judgment: 
 
What then constitutes the horizon of intelligibility in which “regulation”, 
“autonomy”, “state”, and “private entity” become visible [in New York v. United 
States]?  The Heideggerian thesis is that competence with and immersion in a 
network of practical concerns is necessary in order for these particular concepts 
to be intelligible… the intelligibility of “regulation” and “autonomy” is arguably 
parasitic upon…practical competence: being able to distinguish “external” and 
“internal” limitations.7 
 
                                                          
3 Brian Leiter Explaining Theoretical Disagreement 76 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 1215 (2009), at 1227 
4 Brian Leiter Heidegger and the Theory of Adjudication, 106 YALE L.J. 253 (1996) 253. 
5 505 U.S. 144 (1992)  
6 Pub.L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842, (1986), (codified at 42 U.S.C., 1994), hereinafter to be referred to as “the 
Act”.  
7 Supra, note 4, 274-275. 
A number of concepts are mentioned here as part of the “horizon of intelligibility” in New 
York v. United States.  Among these is the concept ‘private’.  Counsel for the United States argued 
that the Constitution permits federal directives to state governments on certain occasions, citing a 
number of authorities.  The majority dismissed this line of argument on the basis that “this [was] not 
a case in which Congress has subjected a State to the same legislation applicable to private parties.”8  
A distinction between public and private entities thus became an important part of the decision.  
Nevertheless there was no discussion of the meaning of the term ‘private’ in the majority decision, 
the dissenting opinion of Justice White or the arguments of counsel.  In order for Justice O’Connor to 
successfully draw this distinction everyone involved must broadly agree on the meaning of ‘private’ 
in this context.9   
On Leiter’s, Heidegger inspired, reading, ‘private’ is part of our existence; understanding ‘it’ 
is about understanding ‘us’ and our practical engagements instead of trying to grasp some 
independent object.10  Justices O’Connor and White came to their common understanding through 
shared experience of a practical world, in the manner that you and I have the same understanding of 
how to use a hammer.  They did not do so by looking the term up in a book, in the manner that you 
or I might consult a dictionary to explain a word in a foreign language.  The legal conception of 
‘private’ is a tool used for practical, day-to-day ends.  As such it does not exist, or make sense, in 
isolation.  A crucial part of how we understand is to see these tools as part of a totality; each piece 
only makes sense because it fits neatly alongside other pieces, in this case ‘state’, ‘autonomy’ and 
‘regulation’, that exist in order to help a judge do his or her job.  
We can see the anti-Cartesianism in this vision.  To describe what counts as understanding in 
adjudication we should look to how judges use concepts like ‘private’ when they put them to 
practical use; it is not about trying to identify ‘justified true belief’ about the nature of ‘private’.  The 
majority in New York v. United States used the concept to distinguish past authorities.   
The account of judicial understanding presented here is practical, but it is also 
interpretative.  Judges know how to do use ‘private’ as a tool by bringing practical experience with 
them.  They do so in a uniform way because of their shared background.   This goes beyond a simple 
claim that our life experiences may impact upon our general outlook and opinions.  How we exist 
becomes central to how we make sense of the world as soon as we look to daily activities for our 
account of understanding.  Our day-to-day existence is how we reason.  This practical, contextual 
background is inescapable.11  
If there were always consensus among legal practitioners in this way one might be tempted 
to agree with the conclusion that the Heideggerian explanation for such consensus leads to 
scepticism as to the value of normative legal theory.  Judges understand things through immersion 
in a judicial culture that cannot be fully explained so a theory of what judges ought to do that is 
based on some grander notion like justice seems redundant.  When judges engage with various 
concepts, like ‘private’, what they see are useful tools that can achieve practice specific ends.  A 
theory by some academic about the ‘real’ meaning of ‘private’ or how judges ought to interpret 
such concepts seems to have no potential impact upon the practice.  Within critical scholarship, 
Pierre Schlag has made a similar argument for decades in a variety of ways.  According to Schlag, 
“normative theory thinks it produces its effects” when in fact “we can [only] usefully read these 
                                                          
8 Supra, note 5 at 161. 
9 This reasoning is criticized in the dissenting judgment of Justice White Ibid., 201-204, but there was no 
disagreement as to the meaning of ‘private’. 
10 See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME, (John MacQuarrie & Edward Robinson trans., Basil Blackwell, 1962), at 
98-104 
11 Id. 171-192. 
theories for what they reveal about the enterprise of normative legal thought”12.  He selectively 
quotes from Heidegger multiple times in the course of this argument13, alongside secondary sources 
based on Heidegger such as Kronman14 and avowedly Heidegger-influenced positions such as those 
of Derrida.  Schlag is far from the only critical jurisprudent to expressly associate Heidegger with this 
position.15  One can see analytical theorists make the same assumption about consequences for 
normative legal theory if one takes ‘the Heideggerian turn’.  Moore’s brief treatment of Heidegger 
claims that his “philosophical hermeneutics cannot be a brand of interpretivism that any 
theoretician should want for her discipline – on pain of losing any discipline at all”.16 In this respect 
he distinguishes Heidegger from Dworkin and other normative theorists who more “modestly 
interpretative”.  So for Moore, taking the Heideggerian turn means giving up on normative theories 
of adjudication.  Even theorists that oppose most critical and analytical forms of legal theory, make 
the same assumption, for the same reasons about Heidegger’s departure from Descartes and the 
consequences for normative legal theory.  We shall see this in detail when we look at Stanley Fish’s 
critiques of Dworkin and others; Fish acknowledges Heidegger as his greatest influence.17 
Adjudication does not only involve agreement, consensus or overlapping opinion.  No issue 
could ever get to court, and hence be adjudicated upon, unless there is some sort of dispute.  This 
‘useful tool’ analogy for how we understand the world around us needs to explain what happens 
when these tools are not working if it is to apply to adjudication.  Heidegger provides such an 
account.  This side of the Heideggerian turn leads directly to a justification of normative theories of 
adjudication; in legal philosophy it has been entirely missed or ignored by ‘Heideggerians’ and ‘anti-
Heideggerians’ alike.   
 
 2.B Disagreement 
 
 Once a case reaches court there must be some disagreement. If our lived in, legal culture 
resulted in utter convergence on every matter of interpretation there would be little space left for 
                                                          
12 See Pierre Schlag Normativity and the Politics of Form 139(4) UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW  (1991) 
801, 844. 829 note 80, 833 note 90 
13 Id. 829 note 80, 833 note 90, 851 note 135, 924 note 317 
14 Id. 907 note 281.  The piece cited is Anthony T. Kronman “Precedent and Tradition” The Yale Law Journal 99, 
(Mar., 1990), pp.1029-1068. 
15 See also Schanck, supra note 1, Edward L. Rubin The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship 86 MICHIGAN 
LAW REVIEW 1835 (1987-1988), Costas Douzinas and Ronnie Warrington POSTMODERN JURISPRUDENCE (Routledge, 
1991) 29-54. and James J. Hamula Philosophical Hermeneutics: Toward and Alternative View of Adjudication 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW (1984) 323. 
16 See Michael S. Moore The Interpretive Turn In Modern Theory: A Turn For The Worse? 41 STANFORD LAW 
REVIEW 871, (1989) 927.  Moore also assumes that Dworkin’s brief but approving references to Heidegger and 
Gadamer would require him to give up the ‘right answer thesis’ id, note 308.  In a footnote he describes 
Heidegger as “a very ambitious interpretivist” and as such aligns him with Rorty and Fish, two noted sceptics 
on the value of normative theory, id. 923 note 226.  Rorty too assumes that Heidegger’s early work renders 
normative theory redundant and he draws this conclusion through some very selective quotation of his own.  
Rorty, however, explicitly parts ways with Heidegger in order to do so.  He disagrees with Heidegger’s later 
work. [add rorty] 
17 Gary A. Olson, Fish Tales: A Conversation with ‘The Contemporary Sophist’ in Stanley Fish, THERE’S NO SUCH 
THING AS FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND IT’S A GOOD THING TOO (Oxford University Press, 1994) 299-300, 281, he also 
name-drops Heidegger at least once as support for his general “anti-foundationalist” position, see STANLEY FISH 
Anti-Foundationalism, Theory Hope and the Teaching of Composition in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, 
RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (Clarendon Press, 1989), 342-355 at 345. 
dispute.  In private law one side would be advised that they have no chance of winning, they thus 
would not pursue an action.18  Even in the most speculative test case imaginable there needs to be 
something to test.   
  Even a basic Heidegger-style sketch of adjudication must explain both how judges 
understand functioning pieces of judicial equipment, like ‘private’ in our example, but also what 
happens when judges encounter problematic or 'broken” pieces of “equipment”.19   For a piece of 
equipment to count as “broken” there must be some degree of uncertainty about it, however slight.  
It does not take major disagreement on the meaning and purpose of law in order for this to 
happen20.  Something as prosaic as the appropriate amount of compensation in a straightforward 
action would count.   My earlier account of agreement in law, where we see everything in terms of 
contextually meaningful tools, involves an attitude towards the world that Heidegger calls ready-to-
hand – the same attitude that we have towards our shared understanding of a hammer.  Any time a 
question of law comes before a court there are elements of what Heidegger calls the “unready-to-
hand” or “present-at-hand”.  This type of engagement leads directly to a justification of theories 
about what judges ought to do.  It is distinctly non-Heideggerian to claim that such theories are 
divorced from practice.  On the contrary, Heidegger’s position is that what we have been calling 
‘theory’ is too much a part of practical engagement to deal with the question of Being.  The delusion 
in western philosophy was its belief that it stood apart from practice; in fact standard western 
theoria inherently serves practice.   
In New York v. United States, Justice O’Connor assesses whether an Act is consistent with 
the Constitution.  Several concepts are involved that Justice O’Connor has this present-at-hand 
attitude towards.  These include ‘Federal Authority’.  Unlike the concept ‘private’, which was usable 
without any reflection on its meaning, Justice O’Connor has found it necessary to test the 
parameters of ‘Federal Authority’.   
Heidegger concedes that we may feel that we encounter independent ‘objects’ when a 
particular ‘tool’ appears troublesome, not useful, or difficult to comprehend.  In such circumstances 
it feels like this object has constantly existed at another level to the practically useful one that we 
are used to.21  We may feel at such a moment that these things have a mind-independent existence 
that we need to capture, in the manner of Descartes with his ball of wax.  The folly of western 
philosophy is to believe that this ‘present-at-hand’ feeling is anything more than temporary and 
anything more than a blip in practical engagement.  Albeit that “pure presence-at-hand announces 
itself in such equipment” it does so “only to withdraw to the readiness-to-hand…of the sort of thing 
we find when we put it back into repair” 22.  In short, theoretical questions arise because of practical 
problems.  We do not just dream up questions such as ‘what are the limits of Federal Authority?’.  
These problems are created on the basis of practical need. 
Such problems are also resolved practically.  We do not get anywhere by “just staring at 
the…thing,” but by finding ways of “seiz[ing] hold of… and using…”23 it.  Mending broken equipment 
is about finding ways to return to our normal, practical attitudes.  No one piece of equipment makes 
                                                          
18 Leiter points out that lawyers would not be able to advise a majority of potential clients against pursuing 
litigation unless there is widespread agreement about law see Leiter, supra note 3. My point here is the 
corollary of Leiter’s; to get as far as adjudication there must be some room for dispute as to the likely 
outcome.  
19 In an exchange with Alan Madry and Joel Richeimer, Leiter noted that his consensus with Heidegger on 
adjudication was limited to an explanation for agreement.  See Brian Leiter, On the Value of Normative Theory: 
A Reply to Madry and Richeimer 4 LEGAL THEORY 241 (1998). Like Rorty, Leiter explicitly parts ways with 
Heidegger on foundational points in order to remain a sceptic about the value of normative theories of 
adjudication.  Leiter’s position is thus not one of those under attack in this essay; in fact, Leiter is one of very 
few legal theorists to recognize how impoverished the “analytical/critical” divide is, see [add].     
20 Leiter notes how rare such ‘theoretical agreements’ actually are, supra note 3. 
21 HEIDEGGER supra, note 10, at 102-103 
22 Id.  
23 Id.  
sense by itself.  Earlier, we saw how the Heideggerian turn in relation to adjudication means that 
judicial ‘equipment’ is understood as part of a ‘totality’; ‘private’ only makes sense as part of a 
seamless ‘horizon of intelligibility’.  Getting to grips with a broken piece of equipment, ‘Federal 
Authority’ here, is also an exercise in making it fit with the totality of equipment once more.  
 Justice O’Connor’s attitude towards Federal Authority is ‘present-at-hand’. The court needed 
to “determine whether any of the three challenged provisions…oversteps the boundary between 
federal and state authority”24.  ‘Federal Authority’ as a piece of equipment appears to be “damaged” 
or “unusable” for deciding whether the Act was constitutional. This is so because judges perceive the 
tools around them as a whole – each part is not an equipment.  ‘Equipment’ is the collection of such 
tools taken together25.  ‘Federal Authority’ is sticking out from the rest of the totality because there 
are competing lines of authority as to its meaning.  Precedent generally suggested that ‘Federal 
Authority’ is transgressed by any requirement for states to legislate in accordance with Federal 
wishes.  On the other hand Counsel for the United States pointed out that some authorities have 
permitted similar directives from Congress to state government in certain circumstances.26  These 
dicta do not fit together as a totality that can be used in order to determine the constitutionality of 
the Act.27      
When Justice O’Connor resolves this issue, or ‘fixes Federal Authority’ according to the 
analogy, she uses practically useful tools that she already understands.  ‘Private’ is just such a 
functioning tool.   
 
Most of our recent cases interpreting the Tenth Amendment have concerned the 
authority of Congress to subject state governments to generally applicable laws...  This 
litigation presents no occasion to apply or revisit the holdings of any of these cases, as this 
is not a case in which Congress has subjected a State to the same legislation applicable to 
private parties.28  
 
We can see here how the judge uses ‘private’ to distinguish one line of authority from 
another.  In this way, the totality of judicial equipment is restored.  ‘Federal Authority’ now fits with 
both lines of authority.  Recent cases in which Congress has been permitted to issue such directives 
are distinguished from the case at hand as ‘Federal Authority’ has only been held to allow such a 
provision in cases where “Congress has subjected a State to the same legislation applicable to 
private parties”.  The concept of ‘Federal Authority’ coheres with the line of authority that suggests 
the relevant provision to transgress the Tenth Amendment as this is not such a situation.  ‘Private’ is 
not the only piece of judicial equipment that she uses here.  ‘State’, ‘Congress’, and ‘government’ 
are also pieces of equipment that are in working order and that help Justice O’Connor to mend 
‘Federal Authority’. 
The manner in which Justice O’Connor makes use of legal concepts, precedent and the 
Constitution also shows how the ‘presence-at-hand’ of the question “withdraws” into “readiness-to-
hand”.  All of the skills involved are themselves learned through practical application.  Justice 
O’Connor has learned how to utilize precedent and interpret the Constitution just as a craftsman 
learns how to use a hammer, by using it as a piece of equipment in-order-to achieve practical ends.  
According to this vision of how we reason, when Justice O’Connor performs all of the actions 
involved in this process – recognising sections of the Constitution as significant, reading those 
                                                          
24 Supra note 5, at 159. 
25 See HEIDEGGER supra note 10, at 97. 
26 Justice O’Connor discusses these arguments in section IV, A of her judgment, supra note 5, 177-181.  Cases 
cited by counsel include South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U. S. 505 (1988), Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit 
Auth. 469 U. S. 528 (1985), and Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).  
27 In a different context, ‘Federal Authority’ might remain “inconspicuous” in the same way that ‘private’ did 
see HEIDEGGER supra, note 10, 102-103.  Similarly, in other contexts ‘private’ might itself appear broken and in 
need of repair. Aspects of Justice White’s dissenting judgment reflect this, see supra note 5 at 201-205.   
28 Supra, note 5, at 160. 
sections, taking the relevant claims about Federal Authority and state sovereignty from it and 
comprehending the terms in those claims – she is adopting a ready-to-hand attitude whereby the 
Constitution appears as a piece of equipment in-order-to mend another, broken, piece. 
For Heidegger, this is all that our theories have amounted to.  They are a “process of 
reflection in service to doing and making”29.  Theoria ultimately involves the same combination of 
shared background presuppositions and purposeful activity that normal, day-to-day understanding 
shows.  Far from being divorced from practice, it is inherently practical (whether we admit it to 
ourselves or not).  Our mistake is to imagine that we have been doing anything more profound than 
mending bits of equipment.  Of course reflection on the meaning of ‘Federal Authority’ is one thing, 
a grand normative theory of adjudication generally is quite another.  In what follows, I shall show 
that these sorts of theories are inherently impactful if we follow Heidegger’s reasoning.   
 
 
3. Judge as Jurisprudent, Heidegger and Dworkin   
 
For Heidegger’s analogy to work every judge must have a sense of an overall purpose behind 
adjudication.  I understand the merits of using a hammer in-order-to put a nail in the living-room 
wall, in-order-to hang a picture because I understand the overall goal of improving the aesthetic 
appearance of my home.  In a judicial context, judges need to have some overall goal in mind when 
they mend broken equipment, even if it is not articulated in the written judgment and even if judges 
are not conscious of using it. Otherwise judges could never put things back together as part of a 
totality.  They would have no sense of what the totality is; it would be like a craftsman trying to build 
a boat with bits of wood and various tools but no concept of the purpose behind a boat.  Just as 
Finnis sees an evaluative enterprise in any description of law, just as Dworkin sees adjudication as a 
constructive interpretation making law the ‘best it can be’, Heidegger’s ‘broken equipment’ analogy 
requires of judges that they have a sense of what law does when it works well in order for the 
analogy itself to make sense.   
Justice O’Connor could not have ‘fixed Federal Authority’ unless she had an overall picture of 
the purpose(s) of adjudication.  Justice White even makes the following claim in his dissenting 
judgment: 
 
[T]he Court makes no effort to explain why this purported distinction should affect the 
analysis of Congress’ power under general principles of federalism and the Tenth 
Amendment.  The distinction, facilely thrown out, is not based on any defensible theory. 
[my emphasis]30  
 
The fact that judges need a purpose in order to adjudicate does not in itself render academic 
debate on what judges ought to do worthwhile.  Yet such debates form part of the life of any 
practicing lawyer.  According to the Heideggerian turn, this lived in culture is how we reason and 
understand.  The relationship between our background ‘being’ and how we act may resist 
theoretical articulation; but that is not to say that such a relationship does not exist.  It simply must 
exist according to this explanation of understanding.  We cannot compel others to follow a set of 
prescribed rules in practical activities, but we certainly can and do contribute to the background, 
shared culture which makes these practices possible and makes any sort of decision-making 
possible.  This aspect of the Heideggerian turn has been lost by those that seek to take it in legal 
philosophy.  Schlag, for example, argues at length against the idea that normative theory has any 
‘role’ to play in the real world of legal bureaucracy – he poses the question of “just who or what 
normative legal thought thinks it is addressing?  What messages are being received and what role do 
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Routledge, 1996), 218 
30 Supra, note 5, at 201. 
normative messages serve?”31   These questions make no sense if we take the Heideggerian turn; 
the whole point is that we understand based on a background that we share with others and that 
defies complete articulation.  As such the questions that Schlag poses are unanswerable.   
Anyone who has attended Law School will be familiar with competing theories of what 
judges ought to do.  Anyone who watches the news, reads a newspaper or listens to a political 
speech is exposed to theories about the ultimate goal of a justice system.  Since our day-to-day way 
of living determines how we understand everything, according to this worldview, it must determine 
how judges understand the purpose behind their profession.  Theories about the point or purpose of 
law are themselves tools that judges use in-order-to mend broken pieces of equipment.  Schlag 
applies this insight to his critique of Dworkin.  According to Schlag, Dworkin is wrong to assume that 
judges can be immunized against non-legal factors in their decision making.  In Heidegger fashion, 
Schlag suggests that historical and sociological factors will inevitably have some impact upon 
adjudication; judges are human, human beings can only reason through their cultural background.  
Yet Schlag fails to realize the full consequences of this turn – if judges cannot rid themselves of 
historical and sociological concerns, the same is true of ‘philosophical’ ones.  If judges cannot help 
but be sociologists or historians, they cannot help but be normative legal theorists.  The degree to 
which a given judge has a keen sense of history or sociology as part of their interpretative make-up is 
moot.  There may be huge differences between members of the judiciary in this respect.  Yet every 
judge has gone to law school, every judge has been exposed to legal theory, however diluted.  It is 
an inevitable part of their background and reasoning processes as a result if we take the 
Heideggerian turn.32    
This account of adjudication is similar to that of Dworkin.  Like Heidegger, Dworkin sees little 
merit in foundational debates and the quest for ‘objectivity’ in our evaluative claims.  Like 
Heidegger, Dworkin sees our interactions with the world as fundamentally interpretative.  Like 
Dworkin’s account of adjudication, a more fully articulated Heideggerian ‘sketch’ makes normative 
theorists out of judges; having a theory of what judges ought to do is a part of our description of 
what judges actually do.  A sense of what judging ought to be colours the interpretative attitude that 
any judge will have to past decisions.  
Dworkin’s account has many detractors.  The purpose of this essay is not to defend this 
understanding of adjudication.  The purpose is to erode an unhelpful distinction between analytical 
and critical jurisprudence by exposing fundamental misconceptions about the Heideggerian turn.  As 
such, Dworkin’s position is helpful; some reactions to it expose key misconceptions about 
Heidegger’s work.  Dworkin approvingly refers to Heidegger in a number of footnotes.  From the 
analytical side, Moore finds this approval odd and claims that such an association would require 
Dworkin to give up his long-standing commitment to the idea of a ‘correct’ interpretation for all 
judicial decisions.  From an expressly pro-Heidegger position, Fish’s best known and most sustained 
arguments against normative theories of adjudication come in his critique of Dworkin.  From an 
overtly critical position, Schlag criticizes Dworkin and others for assuming that their normative legal 
claims “somehow controls the way in which normative legal thought is used”, all the while name-
dropping Heidegger with approval.  These are but three examples of a prevailing assumption that 
the Heideggerian turn means that a normative theorist like Dworkin is wrong to believe that his 
theory can have any impact on practice, much less that he can and should put forward his own 
theory of ‘correct’ judicial interpretation.  In what remains of this section I shall show how common 
‘critical’ arguments against Dworkin’s normativity do not follow from the Heideggerian turn and 
cannot follow from Heidegger’s philosophy generally.  This is a useful way to demonstrate the larger 
point.  Continental or critical theory is not radically ‘other’ than analytical theory.  Dworkin’s account 
of adjudication is more faithful to Heidegger, the philosopher whose position is assumed to mark a 
break with Dworkin’s more analytical tradition. 
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3.A The ‘No Ultimate Truth’ argument  
 
It might be possible to agree with the Heideggerian sketch above and still claim that 
normative legal theory is valueless.  One could argue that since everything is interpretative as well as 
practical there is no ultimate arbiter of ‘truth’.  This would be the case for any claim that we might 
make about what law ought to achieve and hence what judges ought to do when they decide cases.  
As a result, ‘Justice’, ‘Fairness’, ‘Equality’, ‘Integrity’ or anything else that we might care to mention 
as a guide for judging is nothing more than another interpretative concept.  Nothing tells us which 
interpretation is ultimately correct, because no such ultimate correctness exists.  An argument of 
this sort is frequently made by those that critique normative theory using Heidegger or the 
‘continental tradition’.  This is nicely illustrated by arguments made against Dworkin’s normative 
project by Stanley Fish and Pierre Schlag. 
Fish makes the general claim that any guiding concept in interpretation is meaningless once 
we accept that we are engaged in an interpretative act.  With specific reference to Dworkin, Fish 
applies this thinking: 
 
The distinction between principle and policy...is finally a political distinction, a distinction 
with the political aim of claiming for some policy the name of principle.33 
 
For Fish, there is nothing more to the concept “principle” than the rhetoric that might argue 
for something as a principle.  He makes a similar point in three separate critiques, with the repeated 
criticism that Dworkin relies on some ‘brute fact’ meaning behind a judgment as text in order to 
distinguish between a judge applying the law and setting off in a new direction.  So for Fish, Dworkin 
is in error to imagine that “principle” or any “true meaning” within previous legal texts can count as 
a constraint on judicial interpretation; these are just empty rhetorical terms that are hostage to 
interpretation toward a political end. 
Schlag does something very similar in his critique of Dworkin’s normative aims.  Like Fish, 
Schlag sees this as a broader problem with any legal theorist whose “self-conscious motive is...norm 
adoption”34.  Schlag uses an episode of the television series L.A. Law to illustrate how, in the sphere 
of legal practice, “truth, rationality and moral values play a role but only in an instrumental sense – 
only insofar as they aid the lawyer in effectively manipulating the jury”.  As a result, ‘“[l]aying 
principle over practice and “making the law the best it can be”’ are nothing more than acts of 
“manipulation”35, devices used by legal practitioners and judges.  There is nothing in concepts like 
“best” or “principle” that could fetter legal practice or send a judge in one particular direction or 
another.  Normative theory, exemplified by Dworkin, thus provides a public relations exercise 
wherein these laudable sounding concepts are just empty rhetorical flourishes to make law look 
good.36   
 
 Fish, Schlag, and any of the numerous theorists that sympathize with this general starting 
point are free to make this criticism if they wish, but name-dropping Heidegger in support of this 
position is wrong.  Heidegger was nothing like as ‘anti-foundationalist’ as some pithy descriptions of 
his philosophy suggest37.  Heidegger espouses a metaphysical position – the metaphysical richness of 
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his work has lead to a lengthy, ongoing (and fascinating) debate in philosophy as to how that 
position is best described.38  Heidegger’s critique of Descartes is premised on the notion that our 
search for an ultimate grounding for knowledge of ‘reality’ or ‘truth’ is misguided because in our 
daily lives we demonstrate such knowledge all the time.39  There is a fundamental flaw in trying to 
find the ‘external reality’ of what a hammer is; but this is a folly because the reality is not external.  
This is an entirely different proposition from the claim that reality is unavailable to us or the claim 
that it is non-existent or the claim that terms such as ‘principle’ are empty vessels that we are free to 
fill up with whatever we choose.  If our ability to understand a hammer is demonstrated by our 
practical interactions, then our ability to understand the idea of a ‘principle’, ‘best’ or ‘integrity’, is 
also thus demonstrated.  Heidegger does not distinguish between metaphysical kinds in this respect; 
indeed his philosophy could not support such a distinction.  The whole point of the hammer analogy 
is that a theorist’s relationship to a concept such as ‘principle’ is similar to a carpenter’s relationship 
to a hammer.  The same applies mutatis mutandis for any other concept that we might suggest to 
guide adjudication, ‘justice’, ‘fairness’, ‘equality’ or ‘predictability’.  For sure, our understanding of 
these concepts is situated and interpretative but Heidegger clearly explains in his later writings that 
our existing practices uncover truth.40 According to Heidegger, our practical reflection ‘enframes’ 
truth.41  Enframing treats the world around it as “standing-reserve”,42 something that can be 
‘ordered’ and used practically.  Heidegger uses coal-mining as an example.43  In the process of 
extracting coal certain truths are revealed.  The potential for yielding coal and the ease with which 
said coal might be extracted are the sorts of truths plucked out from the vastness and intricacy of 
the earth itself.  We capture these useful bits of truth through a mixture of practical know-how and 
theoria.  A full engagement with the meaning of the earth within our Being would be a task for the 
quietist position that Heidegger develops in later writings44.  Furthermore, the elements exposed by 
our practice specific approaches will be practice specific truths.  Yet Heidegger really could not be 
clearer, or more consistent throughout his work; existing attitudes in practice and theory can and do 
reveal truths about the world to us.  This is a foundational, metaphysical commitment that 
Heidegger rigorously adhered to throughout his career. 
 Any theoria of ‘justice’ will uncover some truth about ‘justice’ as it enframes for practically 
useful purposes.  The world we engage with may be a network of useful tools for our ends, but it 
does not end here.  We grapple with truth in all of these engagements at every time and in every 
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place.  This means that we should not simply throw away the past, as though previous conceptions 
of ‘the earth’ or ‘justice’ were wholly alien to our own.  There is some truth that we share with past 
generations and while our background culture of understanding may alter over time and our 
practical needs may differ from era to era, the idea that these concepts are just empty rhetorical 
devices does not fit at all with Heidegger’s philosophy.  It does not have much in the way of intuitive 
appeal, either, when we reflect on the impact that writers and orators from very different cultural 
backgrounds and epochs have on us.  Fish and Schlag specifically attack contemporary normative 
legal theory, but the same rationale must hold that the speeches of Martin Luther King or the words 
of Socrates resonate with us simply because they are practically useful for our political ends.  It is 
happy coincidence and nothing more that our cultural background has a place for their rhetoric.  In 
lieu of explanation of this phenomenon, we have to rely on pure luck.  If we truly take the 
Heideggerian turn, however, certain words resonate because the speaker was actually on to 
something; these figures captured some truth that still holds today and will continue to hold against 
every background, cultural shift.  Not only is does this resonance of past ideas make sense, it is to be 
expected. 
For Dworkin, “Law’s attitude is constructive; it aims, in the interpretive spirit, to lay principle 
over practice to show the best route to a better future, keeping the right faith with the past”45.  
Schlag’s criticism of this claim is that this is “exactly what ...bureaucratic-lawyers say and do as they 
delay, threaten....manipulate and otherwise kick people around”46 [my emphasis].  Dworkin’s 
position requires us to accept that “principles” are in some sense real, we have captured at least 
some of that reality in the past and should seek to extend those principles through rational 
engagement.  For Schlag, “principles” are just empty pieces of rhetoric, used to do some pretty 
unprincipled things.  Heidegger’s explanation of the relationship between man and world, past 
engagement and practically oriented reflection fit far better with Dworkin’s side in this argument.   
Critical legal theory takes certain debates to have been settled by Heidegger – the 
relationship between man and world, and issues surrounding knowledge of that world.  It then 
assumes that normative theories of adjudication such as that of Dworkin are misguided from that 
position.  This conclusion simply does not follow.  For critical legal theory to adopt Schlag’s position 
on Dworkin and normative theory generally it would need to re-open metaphysical and 
epistemological debates that it has regarded as closed since the mid-twentieth century or at least 
distinguish certain metaphysical kinds from others, in a way that Heidegger does not.47   
 
 
3.B The ‘one-off political goals’ argument 
 
One could concede the point that our ‘principles’ are as real as anything else that we engage 
with, yet still remain hostile to a normative project like Dworkin’s.  Once we accept that our 
concepts are interpretative and practical, the theorist and the judge are both free to use rhetoric in 
any way the community will allow in order to meet expedient needs – the external ‘reality’ is of little 
consequence – the argument might go.  If I am against abortion and I am against euthanasia there is 
no need for me to use the concept of ‘justice’ consistently between the two.  If the judge has a range 
of theories of adjudication in his or her background, he or she need not worry about selecting one 
and sticking to it.  Normative theories of adjudication are thus largely redundant because a judge can 
and will adopt whichever one leads to the desired outcome in one case, then depart from that 
theory in favour of another if it suits their agenda in different instance.   
At this point Schlag’s critique of Dworkin ceases to be useful.  Schlag’s exposition of how 
Dworkin as normative theorist has little to no credible ‘role’ to play in a particular L.A. Law episode 
fails to meet Dworkin head-on.  Dworkin is concerned primarily with good judging in appellate 
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courts, Schlag demonstrates how normative theory such as Dworkin’s seems entirely alien to shoddy 
judicial practices in a fictional drunk-driving case.  While this may be a legitimate criticism of Dworkin 
generally, it does not help move our discussion forward. 
Fish’s critique of Dworkin, on the other hand, is useful.  Heidegger was strongly against any 
conception of time as a series of isolated, one-off moments without future repercussions.  For 
Heidegger, it is not possible to use a piece of equipment for current needs only.  We simply do not 
understand in this way.  In practical activities we are always mindful of others within our 
interpretative community.  Fish is enough of a Heideggerian to say something similar, but from this 
position he criticizes Dworkin’s normative ambitions.  The only standards, according to Fish, are 
these interpretative community ones.  We reproduce such standards on a rote basis; a judge cannot 
fail to do so and still be regarded as “judging” at all.  A repeated criticism of Dworkin, by Fish, is that 
his normative aspirations fall flat because they simply tell judges to do what they are already doing. 
Again, Fish is free to launch this attack on Dworkin if he wishes, but again Heidegger is more 
on Dworkin’s side of this debate than Fish’s, in spite of the assumptions of both analytical and critical 
legal theorists.  Heidegger made normative claims about what we ought to do in day-to-day 
activities that would rule against cherry-picking arguments to suit immediate political goals. 
 ‘Being-with Others’ is an essential aspect of our existence.48  Others infiltrate our 
individuality.  Our very Being is dissolved into that of “Das Man” or “the They”.49 This means that 
when we grasp things as useful pieces of equipment, we grasp them as useful for other people at 
other times and in other contexts.50  Common law provides a particularly good instance of this.51  If 
a judge uses a theory of ‘judging well’ in-order-to reach a verdict, they do so automatically mindful 
of others.  This use of a grand purpose behind law is only possible by projecting how future judges 
might also use this idea of judging well.  If normative theories of adjudication really are nothing 
more than part of a toolbox for practical engagement then how Justice O’Connor reaches a decision 
is part of the legacy of her decision for future judges just as much as her claims about ‘Federal 
Authority’ or her use of the public/private distinction.  This way of judging is part of what theorists 
read when they consult the written judgment.  It will inform their normative claims about 
adjudication when they contribute a theory of ‘judging well’ or ‘judging badly’ to academic 
discourse.  The miasmic squall of the very culture that we use to understand and reason involves a 
constant interplay between practice and theory where each informs the other.  Using any tool 
requires us to project as to how others might use it in other circumstances, even if that tool is a 
normative theory of adjudication.  There is no immediate, one off, use.  The consequences for other 
judges of seeing law in this way are part of the practice.   
We can say the same thing of concepts that we encounter as tools within the critical mass of 
scholarship.  We are incapable of seeing normative arguments about adjudication, or the tools 
contained therein, as disposable implements for present use and no more.  When we use terms like 
‘justice’, ‘equality’ and ‘fairness’ we add to the judicial and academic ‘world’ from which further uses 
will emerge.  Leaving these concepts in good repair for others, and other uses to which they might 
be put, is part of how we understand them.  We might do this well or badly, but the idea that we are 
capable of using a normative theory in a one-off fashion then discarding it afterwards does not fit 
with Heidegger’s claims.52 
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The idea that a judge even could ride roughshod over principles with little to no regard for 
other uses thus requires judges to act in a way that Heidegger believes human beings cannot.  Fish 
by-and-large seems to be on the same side as Heidegger up to this point.53  Fish and Heidegger 
clearly part ways, however, when it comes to the possibility of recommendations as to what we 
ought to do within this conception of human nature.  Like Dworkin, Heidegger rescues the possibility 
of normative claims from within this context laden, interpretative paradigm.   
In a world where we are “thrown” into a background that we had no choice over, and a 
being-with that makes any one of us inextricably part of the “They”, the quest for meaning in our 
lives is to become an “Authentic self”54.  We can never escape the world into which we have been 
thrown, but we can seize hold of our being-in-the-world to achieve a limited sense of individuality.  I 
can harness my thrown self and steer it in a particular direction from within the array of possibilities 
that my background presents.  We do this by treating our past, present and future as a continuous, 
evolving whole.  Any practical engagement that I have can become an Authentic one, but only if I 
make it fit with my past engagements and do it mindful of future ones.  To be Authentic we must be 
conscious of our past and our future and try to make our present fit with both of these.  Heidegger 
saw Authenticity as something achievable that we ought to strive for in practical engagements.  The 
‘do what thou wilt’ style argument is Inauthenticity incarnate.  Perhaps Schlag is right that in some 
instances of adjudication it is difficult to see how Dworkin’s theory plays a role other than as an 
ironic sideshow about how instances of judging lack integrity.  Heidegger accepts that most people, 
most of the time are inauthentic; this is to wilfully ignore our past and our future and make no effort 
to have these cohere.  If one accepts that how we comprehend is ultimately down to how we live, 
then the possibility of normative theory is merely shifted onto a question of how we ought to live.  
Heidegger takes this question seriously and provides an answer with Authenticity. 
It would be wrong to suggest that Authenticity and “adjudication as integrity” amount to the 
same thing.  Authenticity is about instilling our existence with meaning.  Dworkin’s theory is about 
judging well.  Nevertheless, a normative theory applicable to all facets of our practical engagement is 
needed in order to become Authentic, In order to instil his or her existence as a judge with meaning, 
said judge would need to adopt a consistent approach towards the practice of judging.55  So 
Dworkin’s general enterprise and that of other normative theorists is justified rather than 
undermined according to the Heidegger, whether we agree with the substantive content of such 
theories or not. 
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Once again, the only way that critical theory can maintain its scepticism as to the value of 
normative theories of adjudication is by parting ways with Heidegger.  This would require critical 
legal theory to re-open foundational philosophical disputes that it has regarded as closed apart from 
within the other tradition of analytical philosophy. 
Normative legal theory is possible and impactful if we take the Heideggerian turn to its 
logical conclusion.  Indeed, judges need a theory of adjudication in order to do their job if we apply 
Heidegger’s hammer analogy to their practice.  Furthermore, the goal within such theoretical 
enterprises is “correctness”.  Moore is correct to point out that neither Heidegger nor Gadamer 
provides us with a criterion of best interpretation, but Heidegger believed that “correctness” is the 
very goal of theory that is in service to practice; Dworkin is doing exactly what Heidegger believes he 
should.  He offers an account of a ‘true’ or ‘best’ interpretation of law with ‘truth’ taken to mean 
‘correctness’ by the lights of that specific practice. 
A remaining and significant issue is whether this is the sort of enterprise with which theorists 
ought to engage.  There is a definite sense in which Heidegger tried to lead us toward a new type of 
philosophical engagement, or at least a type of philosophical engagement that was new in the 
immediate postwar period.  This may be one of the contributing factors behind the assumption that 
Heidegger’s legacy only supports departure from ‘analytical’ jurisprudence in legal philosophy; in 
what follows I will show that en route to articulating his later form of fundamental ontology 
Heidegger justifies the broad project of analytical legal theory as conceived of by John Finnis.     
 
 
4. Finnis and Heidegger on Practical Philosophy   
 
Douzinas and Warrington are critical legal theorists who have engaged with Heidegger’s 
later work in a sustained fashion.  They also provide a collection of typically ‘critical’ readings of the 
texts of various leading analytical jurisprudents, though in doing so they rely more on Heidegger 
disciples, in particular Derrida.  This includes a deconstruction of John Finnis’ Natural Law and 
Natural Rights56.  As with Schlag’s attitude toward Dworkin, Douzinas and Warrington operate from 
the position that analytical jurisprudence tells us more about the interpreter than the subject 
matter.  Natural Law and Natural Rights is read as a literary work.  Douzinas and Warrington 
emphasize the use of metaphor, imagery and analogy by Finnis.  They do so in order to claim that 
the purported ‘reason’ and ‘rationality’ of Finnis’ position in fact owes its basis to rhetorical sweep 
and literary device. 
Douzinas and Warrington make no mention of the opening chapter in Natural Law and 
Natural Rights, in which Finnis discusses the nature of contemporary analytical jurisprudence and its 
‘selection of viewpoint’. When Heidegger makes his case for a new type of detached philosophy in 
later work, he does so because he felt that our existing philosophical approaches were too much a 
part of the practical activities that they sought to describe. Theory is too in service to practical goals 
to provide a means of engaging with the question of Being.  Finnis suggests that the development of 
contemporary analytical jurisprudence has involved a growing acceptance of this very point.  There 
is a concession to Douzinas, Warrington and Schlag that acts of interpretation tell us much about the 
interpreter, and like Heidegger, Finnis sees analytical approaches as ‘practical philosophy’; crucially, 
recent and contemporary figures engage in ‘viewpoint selection’ and consciously select one from 
within practice. 
 
Hart and Raz are clear that a descriptive theorist, in ‘deciding to attribute a central role’ 
to some particular feature of features of a field of human affairs must ‘be concerned 
with’, ‘refer to’, or ‘reproduce’ one particular practical point of view….he must assess 
importance or significance in similarities and differences within his subject-matter by 
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asking what would be considered important or significant in that field by those whose 
concerns decisions and activities create or constitute the subject matter.57  
 
As Finnis describes it, analytical jurisprudence accepts that any theoretical engagement will involve 
‘a judgment of significance and importance’ when it comes to engagement with the subject matter; 
otherwise ‘a vast rubbish heap of miscellaneous facts’ will be the result of any descriptive account.58  
The viewpoint selected for this enquiry in analytical jurisprudence is the practical one described 
above.  This service to practice is precisely the ‘technological thinking’ that all philosophy has 
engaged with in the western tradition, according to Heidegger.  The only difference would appear to 
be that now Finnis, Raz and others are conscious of doing it. 
Analytical jurisprudence displays awareness that it is one of a number of possible 
perspectives and that this perspective is a practice specific one.  This is indicative of the degree to 
which the Heideggerian turn or something like it has become the norm in all theoretical enterprise.  
A failure to recognize this is a significant oversight when it comes to Heidegger-inspired dismissals of 
analytical jurisprudence generally.  
Heidegger’s philosophy cannot endorse all types of mainstream jurisprudential theoria.  
Heidegger cannot support the notion of prescribing a new set of rules for adjudication that are 
based on reasons that are independent of adjudication itself.  The sort of normative legal theory 
that Schlag attacks is illegitimate and wrongheaded according to the Heideggerian turn: 
 
As in virtually all the work of normative legal thought, the social, rhetorical, institutional, or 
professional mechanisms of realization are assumed to be present, functioning and 
responsive to the ideational recommendations of normative prescription.  It is as if the 
machinery of the social and political world were already constructed with a series of workers 
waiting at the levers for instruction from normative legal thinkers.59 
 
 No serious, contemporary normative theory of common law adjudication provides the sort 
of advance blueprint or map that is anathema to the Heideggerian turn. Being and Time was written 
in 1922.  Normative legal theory produced since is premised on the idea that judges face a limited 
set of options, based on existing practice.  Fish, Schlag, Douzinas and Warrington attack the 
normative ambitions of writers like Dworkin, Moore and Posner.  The explicit attack (or general 
disregard) is not limited to these writers but includes anyone that works within a broad field of 
normative legal theory.  All of these scholars write at a time when the idea that we operate within 
contextual discourse is itself deeply ingrained.60  For sure, Heidegger was an influential figure in this 
shift, along with the later Ludwig Wittgenstein, W.V.O. Quine and Thomas Kuhn in various different 
ways.  Regardless of the source this is so much a part of our psyche that an argument would never 
be published or taken seriously unless the normative side is an account of ‘good practice’ as it 
already exists.  This starting point is so pervasive as to be largely implicit in all writing.  It is part of 
the background of our culture from which we understand everything according to the Heideggerian 
turn.  It is part of our “fore-conceptions” when we do anything as scholars.61   
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The ‘Heideggerian turn’ is also hostile to any descriptive account of adjudication which 
continues to operate within the Cartesian paradigm.  As Finnis’ account shows, such an approach is 
now atypical – the focus instead has been on trying to produce a vision of what is practically good 
from the perspective of situated actors within the practice itself.  One example of such a position 
might be the descriptive side of Michael S. Moore’s philosophy.  Moore’s robust realist metaphysics 
requires the existence of an ‘external’ world that we could be radically wrong about.62 Heidegger’s 
position is simply at odds with this approach.  Moore is also hostile to the ‘interpretative’ turn in 
legal philosophy.  Yet even Moore makes normative suggestions from within a range of options that 
are already part of the existence of the judge, not some radically new range of values and ideals that 
we never see in practice.63  Moore argues, at length, that a natural law theory of interpretation is 
better for reasons of fairness, predictability and justice.  He has to do this.  Otherwise his arguments 
would fall on deaf ears within our intellectual milieu.  Practical, Western Liberal Democratic 
concerns scream out at us, automatically, anytime that we make a claim about how a judge ought to 
decide a case.      
Mainstream, normative theories of adjudication are examples of what Heidegger calls 
theoria; they are instances of goal-oriented, practically useful reflection.  To draw the conclusion 
that theoria has no practical impact is to turn Heidegger on his head.  Heidegger was not a 
jurisprudent.  After Being and Time he moved towards a vision of philosophy that was detached and 
reflective.  Yet Heidegger’s lament on existing theory’s inability to remove itself from practical 
concerns ultimately leads to a response on behalf of such theory to the accusation that normative 
theories of adjudication have no practical impact. Heidegger writes of a “gulf” that “lies 
unbridgeably” between his later, detached position and the sort of theory that informs practical 
engagement.64  . The theoria of practical activities should remain as it is.65  Heidegger claims “the 
sciences would constantly fall into the void if they did not operate within [their own] spheres”66; 
“law” is listed as a science.67  This includes theoretical reflection within those spheres – practical 
philosophy as Finnis calls it. 
All this really leaves is a query as to whether we should give practical theoria the name 
‘philosophy’.  This is a debate for another day, but it is unlikely to be an interesting or important one.  
I very much doubt that it would matter to Dworkin, Moore or Posner.  The important point is that 
what they do on the normative side, whatever one might call it, is justified rather than ruled out 
when we enumerate a proper Heideggerian account.  Similarly, the claim that Heidegger might not 
like the way in which his philosophy is applied here is not particularly interesting.  I am not 
convinced that Heidegger would have objected to the way in which I have applied his concepts, but 
let us suppose that he would have hated what I have done.  Such disapproval would be of little 
consequence.  If looking to past theorists matters at all, it is the realities of their argument, how it 
works and how it applies that are important.  Whether this is what they hoped to achieve or some 
unintended bi-product is of biographical interest only and contributes nothing constructive to 
contemporary debate.  This approach toward the past is itself very Heideggerian, unopening 
possibilities in past use for current and future ready-to-hand issues is precisely what Heidegger 
means by Authenticity. 
 
To take the Heideggerian turn in legal theory leaves us with a clear choice.  One can remain 
loyal to the various commitments and claims that Heidegger thought had ended such debates for 
good.  This leads us to a position similar to that of Finnis on the purpose and place of analytical legal 
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theory generally, and a role for normative theories of adjudication similar to that of Dworkin.  The 
alternative is to re-consider the metaphysics, epistemology and ontology that got Heidegger to this 
point.  If we take the first approach, critical legal theory’s scepticism about normative jurisprudence 
makes no sense.  If we adopt the second, we concede the classic concerns of analytical philosophy 
are still worth debating – Heidegger did not dissolve these problems for good.   
 
Heidegger would probably have disagreed with a great deal in the philosophy of Finnis and 
Dworkin, my purpose is not to claim that they are identical on this or any other issue.  The point 
instead is that there is no yawning chasm between their positions.  Dworkin’s overall project is 
justifiable in Heideggerian terms.  Heidegger sees practical theoria as worthwhile for similar reasons 
to those put forward by Finnis.  All of this means that the one position we cannot arrive at through 
Heidegger is the very position that he is lazily associated with, time and again, throughout legal 
theory.  There is no philosophical basis to the analytical/critical split in jurisprudence – different legal 
theorists ask different questions, but there is no mutual exclusivity of projects along the presumed 
pro and anti-Heidegger lines.  This is a serious challenge to a large section of contemporary legal 
scholarship, yet the lessons of this exercise extend much further.  We should reflect on how it is 
possible that so important a shift in our intellectual paradigm as Heidegger’s species of anti-
Cartesianism should be so carelessly and routinely misused.  In my concluding remarks, I suggest 
how this may have happened and discuss the warning it represents. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
When Heidegger is mentioned by name it is as though writers are citing an unchallengeable 
authority, with no deep engagement, defence or discussion of his ideas.68  At times secondary 
sources have been exclusively relied upon and it is obvious that Heidegger’s work has not been read 
in sufficient depth or perhaps not read at all.69  This use of Heidegger is symptomatic of a wide-
reaching challenge in contemporary theory.  There is more written word for us to contend with than 
at any other point in our history.  This rate of production is increasing.  We generate more analysis 
and there is more “past” work for us to draw on than ever before.  Complex philosophical arguments 
of the past are increasingly reduced to one line general support for a contemporary argument or 
position as a result of this phenomenon.  Philosophers are associated with one idea or “bottom 
line”, they are then name-dropped or quoted as support for a particular position with little to no 
engagement with the ideas and hence no explanation as to how the argument supports the 
conclusion.   
This use of past philosophers is not only dangerous, it is pointless.  There is no practical goal 
to be achieved.  The misuse of Heidegger in legal theory is the most destructive example that I am 
aware of; there are sure to be more.  Name dropping someone famous from the past and pulling 
quotations out that sound a little like what one wishes to say achieves nothing.  It is a rhetorical 
trick, a sleight of hand whereby academics try to legitimize their arguments by associating them with 
someone considered important or clever.  This fawning attitude is not to venerate past thinkers, it is 
to diminish their work; it is not to preserve their ideas, it is to narrow their audience.  Reducing 
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complex arguments to a pithy bottom line may ingratiate a writer with some, but it will immediately 
put off others that do not agree with this (often inaccurate) tagline of what great philosophers stood 
for or which ill-defined “side” they were on.  Often the greatest legacy of thinkers has come not 
from those that agreed with their “big idea”, but from those that disagree with what it says in their 
philosophy dictionary entry.  Marx’s oeuvre and its vast legacy would have been lost to us had he 
not engaged with Hegel and Smith, two writers that he was utterly opposed to politically.  
Heidegger’s work is as good as lost to legal theory if we just reproduce where he was trying to go 
instead deeply engaging in how he tried to get there.   As I have shown here, the results of engaging 
properly with Heidegger are quite the opposite of the assumed bottom line.  There is every 
possibility that he would have disapproved of my use of his work, but this makes no difference.  It 
does not matter whether the ideas that he has left us with are indicative of where he wished to go 
with his work, or some unintended bi-product.  Philosophy is not cheerleading.  It is not about 
proving that you are part of some team.  Philosophy is inescapably about truth, regardless of one’s 
position on the meaning of the term.  This includes legal philosophy.  Whether truth is real or ideal, 
universal or particular, graspable or not, we are all trying to shine a light of discovery on the practice 
in what we do.  Past argument may help us on that journey.  Citing famous people like evidence for 
what we want to find will not.  Heidegger himself warned against the dangers of a “forgetful” 
attitude towards the past.  Not everyone will agree with Heidegger on all matters.  I certainly do not.  
Yet the idea that our past must be seen in all its complexity and possibilities, rather than a closed 
book of one line answers, is one that we should all endorse.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
